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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated § 78-2a-3 (2) (i) , stating that the Court of Appeals
has appellate jurisdiction over appeals from the District Court
involving domestic relations cases, including but not limited to
divorce and property division.

Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of

Appellate Procedure also indicates a procedure for taking appeals
from judgments and orders of trial courts. This brief follows the
structural requirements outlined in Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of
Appellant Procedure.

This is a brief by Kaylene S. Smith,

Plaintiff, in support of a judgment and Decree of Divorce entered
below.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion in making

the award of alimony that it did.

1

2.

Whether the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are

sufficient to support the award of alimony.
3.

Whether the Court properly entered its Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law.
4.

Whether the Court erred in obligating Defendant to pay an

income tax liability.
5.

Whether the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are

sufficient to support the award of attorney fees.
STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL
The Standard of Review on Appeal is that the trial court, in
a divorce action, has considerable latitude of discretion in
adjusting financial and property interests.

Thus, the Appellate

Court may reverse only if the appellant proves that there was a
misunderstanding

or

substantial

prejudicial

and

misapplication
error;

of

the

or

the

law

resulting

evidence

in

clearly

preponderated against the findings; or such a serious inequity has
resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion, as set forth
in English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah 1977).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a Judgment and Decree of Divorce
entered by the Honorable Clint S. Judkins sitting as a District

2

Court Judge on or about October 14, 1992. R. 68-78 (Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law).
At trial, Plaintiff appeared and was represented by Attorney
Jeff R. Thome. Defendant appeared and was represented by Attorney
Brent E. Johns.

A trial was held on the matter in which the only

witnesses were plaintiff, defendant, and plaintiff's daughter.
Judge Judkins entered his decision on the day of trial and
Plaintiff's attorney prepared Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and Decree of Divorce. T. 173-178
Plaintiff's

attorney

prepared

a

Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce and forwarded same to
defendant's attorney on or about September 24, 1992. R. 66 (Letter
to Brent Johns dated September 24, 1992.)

Defendant's attorney

objected to paragraphs 10, 15, 16 and 17 of the Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and paragraph 14 of the Decree of Divorce as
set forth in his letter to plaintiff's attorney dated October 1,
1992. R. 67

(Letter to Jeff Thome

dated October

1, 1992.)

Defendant's attorney withdrew as counsel on October 14, 1992. R. 84
(Withdrawal of Counsel.) Plaintiff's attorney forwarded, together
with a letter to the Court, the Decree of Divorce, Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law as well as Brent John's letter of October 1,
1992. R. 65 (Letter to Judge Judkins dated October 5, 1992.)
3

The

Decree and Findings were submitted to the Court together with a
letter which indicated in part that it was being submitted for
"either signing or modification as you see fit." R. (Letter to
Judge Judkins dated October 5, 1992.)

Judge Judkins made one

change at paragraph 16 of the Findings of Fact, and signed the
Decree of Divorce which was entered on October 14, 1992. R. 68-83
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Decree of Divorce.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff and defendant met in the summer of 1980 when
plaintiff gained employment as a secretary at defendant's Grain
Elevator operation.

Both parties were married to other people at

the time. (T. 11 and 12)

Some time later, the relationship

developed into a romantic relationship. (T. 12) Plaintiff obtained
a divorce from her husband in 1983.
until defendant was divorced.

The relationship continued

Defendant obtained a divorce from

his wife in 1986. (T. 13 and 69) At that time, defendant assisted
plaintiff in moving to Brigham City, Utah in January of 1986. (T.
70) Defendant moved to Brigham City, Utah in June of 1986. (T. 70
and 71)

The parties maintained separate residences but continued

their relationship until they were married on August 14, 1989. (T.
17 and 73-74)
Pursuant to his divorce from his former wife, defendant
4

received a settlement to compensate him for his interest in the
family farm operation.

It is disputed as to both the amount of

settlement and as to how the amounts were arrived at.

Defendant

did not work during the time of the marriage. (T. 116)

Plaintiff

worked for Brigham Realty, Richard's Manufacturing Jewelers and
Weinstocks while the parties resided in Brigham City. (T. 51-53)
Plaintiff filed a Verified Complaint, Order to Show Cause and
Temporary Restraining Order on September 13, 1991. (R. 1-11)

A

trial was held on August 28, 1992, and the divorce entered on
October 14, 1992. T. 68-78 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law)

Defendant filed an appeal from this decision on November 12,

1992. R. 85 and 86 (Notice of Appeal)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant's Appeal is primarily centered around three issues,
those being alimony, division of an income tax liability and
attorney fees.

The Court did not abuse its discretion in these

areas, and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which
were adequately supported by the evidence.
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were appropriately
entered, irrespective of the withdrawal of defendant's attorney
after the trial had ended.
With regard to alimony, the Court did not err in its award to
5

plaintiff.

First, the Findings are adequate and are supported by

the evidence at trial. Second, the Findings address the financial
condition and needs of the plaintiff; the ability of plaintiff to
produce an income for herself; and the ability of defendant to
provide support. Finally, the Court properly excluded defendant's
exhibits 4 and 5, under the Utah Rules of Evidence, Rules 402 and
403.
The Court did not err in requiring defendant to pay the income
tax liability incurred as a result of the parties filing an amended
and joint income tax return.
The final issue defendant raises on appeal is attorney fees
which were appropriately awarded on the basis that there was a
showing of need on the part of the plaintiff for that award, and
there was also a showing of the reasonableness of the fees.
trial court in

The

this case entered findings which are supported by

the actual evidence taken at trial.

As such, the trial court's

ruling should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN ITS AWARD OF ALIMONY
The Court should affirm the alimony award on the basis that
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered below are
6

sufficient to support the alimony award.
A. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lav are Sufficient to
Support the Avard of Alimony.
The trial court, in a divorce action, has considerable
latitude

of

interests.

discretion

in

adjusting

financial

and

property

A party appealing therefrom has the burden to prove

there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting
in substantial and prejudicial error; or the evidence clearly
preponderated against the findings; or such a serious inequity has
resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion. English v.
English, 565 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah 1977) (citing Baker v. Baker. 551
P.2d 1263 (Utah 1976)). The trial court in this case did not abuse
its discretion. The award of alimony in this action was consistent
with the purposes of an alimony award as articulated by this Court.
The Court has described the purpose of alimony: "The most
important function of alimony is to provide support for the wife as
nearly as possible at the standard of living she enjoyed during
marriage, and to prevent the wife from becoming a public charge."
English, 565 P.2d at 411. An alimony award should, to the extent
possible, equalize the parties' respective post-divorce living
standards and maintain them at a level as close as possible to that
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. Rasband v. Rasband.
7

752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah App. 1988) (citing Gardner v. Gardnerf
748 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 1988); Jones v. Jones. 700 P.2d 1072,
1075 (Utah 1985)).
In this action the award fulfills the stated purpose of an
alimony award.

Prior to the parties7 marriage the plaintiff was

working and earning a net income of approximately $1,000.00 per
month.

Plaintiff also was earning $1,000.00 per month during the

marriage. The plaintiff terminated her employment, and is now only
making approximately $400.00 per month in income. R. 73 (Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law)
The Court found that the plaintiff has suffered an economic
disadvantage as a result of the marriage in that she does not have
as good as employment as she had before the marriage. R. 77
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law)

The Court then ordered

defendant to pay alimony to the plaintiff in the amount of $643.00
per month for a period of one year.

Thereafter, defendant was

ordered to pay alimony in the amount of $600.00 per month for the
next two years. R. 77-78 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law)
The award of $600.00 per month alimony will allow plaintiff to
maintain the standard of living she enjoyed prior to and during the
marriage.

The $400.00 per month income that the plaintiff is now

earning, and the $600.00 per month alimony award will allow
8

plaintiff to approximate her accustomed standard of living.
The alimony award will also serve to equalize the parties'
respective post-divorce living standards.

Defendant after paying

the $600.00 per month will still be left with sufficient resources
to maintain his standard of living.

The record clearly indicates

that defendant will have sufficient interest income and social
security income to maintain himself in his accustomed standard of
living. The record also tends to show that defendant received
approximately $25,000.00 per year in rental income from a lease of
three sections of property to his son. T. 232 and 236
Defendant will earn a substantial amount of interest income
from Smith Farms, Zions Bank, First Security Bank, and other
sources. T. 135
his

As part of his written settlement agreement with

first wife, defendant

was entitled

$210,000.00 and $150,000.00.

to cash payments of

The $210,000.00 was to be paid

$30,000.00 on or before April 20, 1986, $30,000.00 upon the closing
of a loan, $150,000.00 payable in annual payments of $25,000.00 per
year including interest at the rate of 8 percent.
defendant

was to be paid

by his

former wife

Additionally,
an additional

$150,000.00 within five years from the date of the divorce. R. 70
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) Defendant will also earn
interest on his account with American First Credit Union that had
9

a balance of $41,275.00 as of September 14, 1991, as well as on his
share savings account that had a balance of $9,532.16. R. 70
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law)
Defendant also had five different certificates of deposit with
First Security Bank in Challis, Idaho. The money was deposited on
March 27, 1991, each account had an initial deposit of $36,000.00,
and accrued interest at the rate of 6.83% per annum.

These

accounts totalled $180,000.00 on March 17, 1992. R. 71 (Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law)
Defendant also received the sum of $249,120.93, on or about
March

27, 1991, for his share of any

properties

he

was

awarded

under

his

interest
prior

in the farm

divorce

decree.

Defendant is unable to state whether the money constituted earnings
off the farm property or whether it was all principal and interest
from the sale of the property. R. 71

(Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law) Regardless of the source of the money, in the
future defendant will be able to earn substantial income in the
form of interest from this sum.
Defendant is also eligible for social security.

Defendant

stated that he would be entitled to approximately $350.00 per
month.
Defendant cannot be heard to claim that he has no income with
10

which to pay the alimony award.

Just because defendant is

unemployed and therefore earns no income from wages, this does not
mean that defendant has no income.

In fact as set out above,

defendant has substantial income from interest earnings as well as
his entitlement to social security.

Defendant is entitled to

$350.00 per month in social security for a total of $4,200 per
year, and defendant receives $10,000.00 - $12,000.00 per year in
interest income. T. 275 Defendant clearly will be able to maintain
his standard of living after paying the alimony award.
The award will also serve to equalize the parties7 respective
post-divorce living standards. At plaintiff's current income level
she is earning only $4,800.00 per year. Without the alimony, there
would be a great disparity between plaintiff's and defendant's
respective standards of living.

Thus, the award of alimony is

necessary to partially equalize the disparity in the parties' postdivorce standards of living.
As the Court has stated, this court will not disturb the trial
court's award of spousal support absent a showing of a clear and
prejudicial abuse of discretion. Rasband, 752 P.2d at 1333 (citing
Paffel v. Paffel. 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986).

As set out above,

the alimony award in this action serves the very purpose of alimony
in allowing plaintiff to maintain her standard of living, and
11

equalizing the parties' post-divorce living standards.

Thus, the

trial court clearly did not abuse its discretion.
The Court in Jones. 700 P. 2d at 1075, articulated three
factors that must be considered in fixing a reasonable alimony
award: 1. the financial conditions and needs of the wife; 2. the
ability of the wife to produce a sufficient income for herself; and
3. the ability of the husband to provide support.
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in this action
address the three factors set out above.
First, the financial condition and needs of the plaintiff are
addressed in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

The

plaintiff has suffered an economic disadvantage as a result of the
marriage in that she does not have as good as employment as she had
before the marriage and during the marriage before she quit her
employment due, at least in part, to the urging of the defendant.
R. 77 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law)

The plaintiff is

currently employed and earning approximately $400.00 per month.
This is compared with the $1,000.00 per month plaintiff was earning
before and during part of the marriage. R. 73 (Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law)

The plaintiff needs an income on an average

monthly basis of $1,162.00 to enable her to live similar to how she
lived during the marriage, and to meet her current living expenses
12

and obligations. R. 73 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law)
Thus plaintiff is in need of approximately $762.00 per month to
maintain her standard of living.
Second, the ability of plaintiff to produce a sufficient
income for herself is also stated in the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law. As set out under the first factor, plaintiff's
current income is only $400.00 per month. R. 73 (Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law)

Plaintiff has not been able to find

employment that will produce sufficient income for her to support
herself.
Plaintiff was employed at a job with Weinstocks that would
have allowed her to support herself.

However, defendant and

plaintiff came to a mutual agreement that plaintiff should leave
that job. T. 211, 212, and 252 The transcript reveals evidence of
defendant's displeasure with plaintiff's job, and his feelings that
plaintiff should leave the job.

Plaintiff stated that defendant

did not want her to work, rather defendant wanted plaintiff to stay
home with him. T. 128 and 159

The job at Weinstocks was hard on

the marriage since plaintiff often had to work from 4:00 to 5:00
p.m. until midnight. T. 161 and 163

Defendant did not believe the

job was worth the expense, and the wear and tear on their car. T.
163, 208, 211, and 212 Defendant also felt that plaintiff's safety
13

was at risk working at the job at Weinstocks.

Defendant stated

that he had heard that cars had been broken into and people had
been mugged in the parking lot at plaintiff's employment. T. 208
and 209
job.

Plaintiff agreed with defendant's concerns and left her

Thus, defendant's urging led plaintiff to give up the job

that would have allowed her to come closer to supporting herself.
Plaintiff's future ability to produce sufficient income for
herself has also been brought into question by her present medical
condition. That plaintiff is in need of surgery was established in
evidence pursuant to a letter from Dr. C. M. Dibble.

Plaintiff's

condition requiring this surgery arose during the marriage. R. 73
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law)

Plaintiff does not have

enough money for the surgery, and it is not clear whether or not
she will be physically capable of full-time work until she has had
the surgery. T. 132
Third, the ability of the defendant to provide support has
also been shown.

Although defendant was unable or unwilling to

explain his present financial condition, certain facts may be
extracted from the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and from
the

transcript.

defendant's

As

part

of

the

settlement

agreement

with

first wife, he was entitled to cash payments of

$210,000.00 and $150,000.00.

The $210,000.00 was to be paid
14

$30,000.00 on or before April 20, 1986, $30,000.00 upon the closing
of a loan, $150,000.00 payable in annual payments of $25,000.00 per
year including interest at the rate of 8% per annum. Defendant was
also to receive an additional $150,000.00 within five years from
the date of the divorce. R. 70 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law)

Defendant also had an account with American First Credit

Union with a balance of $41,275.00, and a share savings account in
the amount of $9,532.16.

Defendant also had

five different

certificates of deposit with First Security Bank in Challis, Idaho.
Each account had an initial deposit of $36,000.00 and accrued
interest at the rate of 6.83% per annum.

The accounts totalled

$180,000.00 on March 17, 1992. R. 70 and 71 (Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law)
Defendant also received $249,120.93 on or about March 27,
1991, for his share of any interest in the farm properties he was
awarded under his prior divorce decree.

Defendant was unable to

articulate how the amount of money was computed.

Defendant was

also unable to articulate whether the money constituted earnings
off the farm property which he held in common with his ex-wife, or
whether it was all principal and interest from the sale of the
property. R. 71 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law)
Defendant

is

also

eligible
15

for

social

security

of

approximately $350.00 per month.
Although the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law address
the defendant's ability to provide support, the Court must also
consider the transcript from this action.

The Court need only

make a cursory review of the transcript, especially the crossexamination

of

defendant,

determining

defendant's

to

understand

the

difficulty

financial condition.

in

Defendant was

clearly unable or unwilling to disclose his financial condition;
however, certain facts may be clearly drawn from the transcript.
It is clear that defendant will earn a substantial amount of
interest income from Smith Farms, Zions Bank, First Security Bank,
and other sources. T. 135
interest

income

in

a two

Defendant made over $17,480.72 in
year

period

during

the marriage.

Defendant reported this interest income as joint income on his tax
returns over the two years. T. 247 and 248
In
appears

considering
that

defendant's

defendant

earns

entire

$350.00

financial
per

month

position
from

it

social

security, and $10,000.00 - $12,000.00 per year in interest income.
T. 275

Defendant also stated that he received approximately

$25,000.00 per year in rental income from a lease of three sections
of farming property. T. 232 and 236 Despite defendant's inability
or unwillingness to completely outline his financial condition,
16

taking the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the evidence
from the transcript as a whole, it appears clear that defendant has
the ability to provide support.
The Court has stated that [i]f these three factors have been
considered, we will not disturb the trial court's alimony award
unless such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear
abuse of discretion. Rappleye v. Rappleye, 215 Utah Adv. Rep. 45,
47 (Utah App. 1993) (citing Morgan v. Morgan. 213 Utah Adv. Rep.
22, 26 (Utah App. 1993)) (quoting Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d
84, 90 (Utah App. 1989)) (citation omitted).
has resulted

in this case.

No serious inequity

Plaintiff has been placed in a

position, due to the alimony award, where she may be able to
maintain the standard of living she enjoyed prior to the marriage.
The trial court considered the three factors, as set out above, and
did not abuse its discretion. Thus, this Court should not disturb
the trial court's alimony award.
B. The Court Did Not Err in Entering the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.
The trial court asked plaintiff's attorney to prepare the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and send them to opposing
counsel for approval, and then to see that they were submitted to
the court. T. 284

Plaintiff's attorney prepared the Findings and
17

Conclusions

and

forwarded

them

to

defendant's

attorney,

on

September 24, 1992. R. 66 Defendant's attorney replied by a letter
dated October 1, 1992, indicating that he disagreed in part with
the Findings at paragraph 10, 15, 16, and 17 and paragraph 14 of
the Decree of Divorce, R. 67 (Letter to Jeff Thorne dated October
1, 1992)

Plaintiff's attorney submitted the Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law to the court with a letter to Judge Judkins
dated

October

5,

1992.

The

letter

informed

the

court

of

plaintiff's and defendant's differences as to the Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, and asked the court to modify the documents
as the court saw fit. R. 65 (Letter to Judge Judkins dated October
5, 1992) The court was able to review plaintiff's and defendant's
positions and it in fact made a change to plaintiff's documents,
before issuing its final Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and Decree of Divorce.
No violation of Rule 4-504 of the Utah Rules of Judicial
Administration occurred.

In fact, defendant has not set out any

alleged violations in his brief. Defendant cannot request that his
attorney withdraw from the case and then subsequently protest that
the attorney, who he requested to withdraw, should have proceeded
to object to the Findings and Decree of Divorce.

Defendant

obviously was unhappy with the court's decision; however, he cannot
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use his own request to his attorney to withdraw as a basis to have
the decision he disagreed with set aside on appeal.
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are not against
the weight of the evidence, and were not improperly entered under
Rule 4-504 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration.
C

The Court Did Not Err in Its Exclusion of Certain Evidence
Defendant's attorney attempted to admit into evidence, a

letter marked Defendant's exhibit #4, which was a letter to
plaintiff's girlfriend in Idaho dated January 7, 1990.

Defendant

testified that he found the letter in the garbage where it was torn
up and that he pieced it together.

Defendant's attorney also

attempted to admit exhibit #5, another letter from plaintiff to her
parents, dated January 5, 1990, into evidence.

This letter was

also found in the trash where it had been torn up and was also
pieced back together by defendant.

Neither exhibit 4 nor exhibit

5 was admitted into evidence.
The trial court questioned the materiality of the letters. T.
203

Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 402 provides:
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provided by the Constitution of the United States or the
Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these
rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this
state. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.
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The court sustained plaintiff's objection, to the admissibility of
the letters, stating that it felt that had the letters been
delivered there would be a question as to their materiality;
however, since plaintiff had torn up and thrown away the letters,
they were clearly not material. T. 204

The court stated that it

would sustain plaintiff's objection unless defendant could offer
anything else to substantiate his claims that the letters should be
admitted. T. 204

Defendant's attorney did not offer any other

arguments or grounds for the letters' admissibility, but rather
moved on to another issue.
As provided in Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 403:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.
The court clearly questioned the relevancy of the letters. Even if
there

was

a possibility

that

the

letters

had

some

minimal

relevancy, the trial court was clearly acting within its proper
bounds of discretion in excluding the evidence under Rule 403.
Clearly these letters addressed collateral matters which were not
central to the divorce proceedings. The trial court properly used
its discretion in excluding the exhibits.
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The law is clear that in matters of determining materiality
the trial court should be accorded a large measure of discretion
and should only be reversed if this discretion is abused. Martin v.
Safewav Stores. Inc., 565 P.2d 1139, 1141 (Utah 1977).
In In the Interest of R.R.D.. 791 P.2d 206 (Utah App. 1990),
a case where the issue was whether a juvenile should be treated as
an adult, the trial court excluded a comparison of records of other
youths within the Youth Corrections.

The juvenile appealed the

exclusion arguing that the evidence excluded would show that the
average youth in secure confinement had committed more offenses
than R.R.D.
evidence,

This Court upheld the lower court's exclusion of the
The Court stated that trial courts are given great

discretion to determine the relevance and weight of submitted
evidence because of their competence in judging the exigencies of
a particular case. Terry v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst.. 605 P.2d
314, 322-23 (Utah 1979), overruled on other grounds, McFarland v.
Skaggs Cos., Inc., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984).

Consequently, a

court's determination in this regard will not be reversed unless it
is shown that there was an abuse of that discretion. Terry, 605
P.2d at 323; In the Interest of R.R.D. . 791 P.2d at 212.

Clearly,

in this case the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
excluding the exhibits.
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D. The Court Did Not Err in Awarding Alimony, and Did Not
Improperly Award to Plaintiff, Defendant's Premarital Assets.
The trial court made findings as to defendant's sources of
income

and

the

record

defendant's income.

is

replete

with

testimony

regarding

Therefore, defendant's argument that the

alimony must be paid out of premarital assets is not founded on the
evidence in the record.

As has been previously

set forth,

defendant earns $350.00 per month in social security and $10,000.00
- $12,000.00 per year in interest income. T. 275

Defendant has

also stated that he received approximately $25,000.00 per year in
rental income from a lease of three sections of farming property.
T. 232 and 236 In addition, during the marriage defendant received
$249,120.93 for his share of any interest he held in farm property.
Defendant was unable or unwilling to articulate whether this
payment constituted earnings off of the farm property. R. 71
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law)

As further evidence of

defendant's income potential, it should be noted that defendant
reported over $17,480.72 as joint income on his tax returns during
the two years of the marriage. T. 247 and 248
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the record
clearly show that defendant has a substantial stream of income from
which to pay the alimony award, and that the alimony is not being
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paid out of defendant's premarital assets. Thus, the trial court's
award of alimony was proper and not an abuse of discretion.
Even if this Court determined that the alimony is being paid
out of premarital assets, the trial court's award of alimony is
still proper and not an abuse of discretion.

Utah Code Ann. § 30-

3-5 (1) (1989) provides in part that "[w]hen a decree of divorce is
entered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating to
the children, property, and parties ..."

The Utah Supreme Court

has concluded that this statute confers "broad discretion upon
trial courts in the division of property, regardless of its source
or time of acquisition." Walters v. Walters. 812 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah
App. 1991) (quoting Burke v. Burke. 733 P.2d 133, 134-35 (Utah
1987)). Further, "the purpose of property divisions is to allocate
property in the manner which best serves the needs of the parties
and best permits them to pursue their separate lives." Noble v.
Noble. 761 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1988) (quoting Burke. 733 P.2d at
135) .
The general rule is that premarital property is viewed as
separate property.
fashioning

However, this rule is not invariable.

an equitable property division, trial

"In

courts need

consider all of the pertinent circumstances." Burke, 733 P.2d at
135.

In Walters 812 P.2d at 67, the court set out several factors
23

to be considered:
the amount and kind of property to be divided; whether
the property was acquired before or during the marriage;
the source of the property; the health of the parties;
the parties' standard of living, respective financial
conditions, needs, and earning capacity; the duration of
the marriage; the children of the marriage; the parties'
ages at the time of marriage and of divorce; what the
parties gave up by the marriage; and the necessary
relationship the property division has with the amount of
alimony and child support to be awarded.
Where unique circumstances exist, a trial court may reallocate
premarital property as part of property division incident to
divorce. Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 424-25 (Utah App. 1990).
Several of the factors listed are of importance in this case.
In considering the amount and kind of property to be divided, it is
clear that defendant received a substantial amount of interest
income and rental

income during the course of the marriage.

Defendant is also eligible for social security income.
The plaintiff's health is also an important issue in this
case. The trial court entered a specific finding as to plaintiff's
need for surgery, and that the condition arose during the marriage.
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R. 73 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law)
The

parties'

standard

of

living,

respective

financial

conditions, needs, and earning capacities have also been addressed
at length under POINT I. A.. It is clear that without the award of
alimony, plaintiff's

standard of living will be dramatically

reduced; whereas, the defendant would be able to maintain his
standard of living while paying the alimony award.

The financial

condition, needs, and earning capacity of plaintiff have also been
established.

Plaintiff's

ability

to

produce

income

is

approximately $762.00 per month less than the amount she needs to
live on. Defendant's financial condition is substantially stronger
than plaintiff's, and he will easily be able to cover his needs and
pay the award of alimony to plaintiff.
The relationship between the property division and the amount
of alimony is also an important factor in this action. There is a
vast disparity between the amount of property awarded to plaintiff
and that awarded to defendant.

Plaintiff cannot use the minimal

amount of property she was awarded to sustain herself; whereas,
defendant will be able to live in relative ease and comfort from
the property he was awarded.

Also if this Court allows defendant

to deny that he earns a substantial amount of income from social
security, interest, and rent; then defendant will be able to live
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in relative ease from his substantial assets, while pleading
poverty and no income when faced with the prospect of having to pay
alimony. The alimony award is necessary for plaintiff to maintain
her standard of living given her paucity of assets.

If this Court

determines that defendant has no income, then an award to plaintiff
of defendant's premarital assets is the only just resolution of
this issue.

Without the alimony award plaintiff would leave the

marriage with very few assets and no money, and without the ability
to maintain her standard of living.
As the court stated in Noble, 761 P.2d at 1373, there is no
per se ban on awarding one spouse a portion of the premarital
assets of another... under appropriate circumstances, achieving a
fair, just, and equitable result may require that the trial court
exercise its discretion to award one spouse the premarital property
of another.

In this action plaintiff was awarded only minimal

assets and the alimony award is the only means plaintiff has to
maintain her standard of living.

The trial court properly viewed

this relationship between the property division and the award of
alimony in this action.
The Utah Supreme Court in Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276,
1279 n.l (Utah 1987), explained that the issues of alimony and
property division are not entirely separable.
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[N]either the trial court nor this Court considers the
property division in a vacuum. The amount of alimony
awarded and the relative earning capabilities of the
parties are also relevant, because the relative abilities
of the spouses to support themselves after the divorce
are pertinent to an equitable determination of the
division of the fixed assets of the marriage.
If this Court allows defendant to characterize his social security,
interest,

and rental

income as premarital property,

then an

equitable division of his "premarital" property would be just and
proper given the relative earning capabilities of the parties and
the needs of the plaintiff.
The court, in Noble, was faced with a situation where the
wife, Elaine, had been awarded by the trial court a substantial
portion of the husband's, Glen's, premarital property because of
the husband's inability to provide sufficient alimony.

Glen

appealed the award of the premarital property to Elaine. The court
stated that, "[t]he gross inadequacy of the alimony available to
provide for Elaine's needs, the paucity of her separate premarital
property, and Glen's relative wealth all warranted Judge Tibb's
awarding

Elaine

a

substantial

portion

of

Glen's

premarital

property. Noble, 761 P.2d at 1373.
If this Court allows defendant to classify all of his income
as premarital assets, then this action presents a situation similar
to that presented in Noble. Defendant would then be in a position
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to claim an inability to provide alimony for plaintiff's needs;
plaintiff has very few premarital assets; and defendant is in a
position of relative wealth. The difference in this action is that
plaintiff would only be awarded a small portion of defendant's
premarital property in the form of alimony as compared to the
substantial portion of premarital property awarded in Noble.
Therefore, the alimony award in this action is proper either
as an award out of defendant's income, or as a just and equitable
award of a small portion of defendant's premarital assets.

The

trial court in this action did not abuse its discretion and the
award of alimony to the plaintiff should be affirmed.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ORDERING DEFENDANT TO PAY THE
INCOME TAX LIABILITY
The trial court acted within its proper discretion in ordering
that defendant pay the income tax liability. R. 76 (Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law) Plaintiff received a notice from the
state tax commission stating that there were some back taxes due to
the state. T. 133

This liability resulted when plaintiff amended

her tax return upon defendant's request.

Plaintiff had filed

married separate, and defendant informed plaintiff that he would
save money if plaintiff would amend her return and file jointly. T.
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170 Defendant convinced plaintiff to switch her filing status, and
assured her that he would pay any balance due as a result of the
revision in her filing status. T. 133, 134, 170, and 216.
Plaintiff complied with her part of the agreement by amending
her return. Now defendant asks the Court to allow him to back out
of his part of their agreement by setting aside the trial court's
order that he pay the tax liability. In Rasband, 752 P.2d at 1335,
this Court stated that [t]he trial court in a divorce action has
considerable discretion in equitably adjusting the financial and
property interests of the parties. Argyle v. Argyle. 688 P.2d 468,
470 (Utah 1984); Lee v. Lee. 744 P.2d 1378, 1380 (Utah App. 1987).
Because the court's distribution of property is endowed with a
presumption of validity, Pusev v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 119 (Utah
1986), we will not disturb it on appeal unless it is clearly unjust
or a clear abuse of discretion. Gardner v. Gardner. 748 P.2d 1076,
1078 (Utah 1988); Smith v. Smith. 78 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Ct. App.
1988).
The trial court in this case has not abused its discretion,
and it is clearly not unjust for the court to insist that defendant
live up to his end of the agreement he made with plaintiff.
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POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ORDERING DEFENDANT TO PAY ATTORNEY
FEES.
A. Plaintiff was Entitled to Attorney Fees in the Divorce Action.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (1989) gives trial courts the power to
award attorney fees in divorce actions. Morgan v. Morgan. 213 Utah
Adv. Rep. 22, 27 (Utah App. 1993).

Both the decision to award

attorney fees, and the amount of such fees, are within the sound
discretion of the court. Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P. 2d 836, 840 (Utah
App. 1991).

The award must be based on evidence of both financial

need and reasonableness. Rasband, 752 P. 2d at 1336 (citing Beals v.
Beals, 682 P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1984)).
Reasonable attorney fees are not measured by what an attorney
actually bills, nor is the number of hours spent on the case
determinative in computing fees. In determining the reasonableness
of attorney fees, ... a court may consider among other factors, the
difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys in
presenting the case, the reasonableness of the number of hours
spent on the case, the fee customarily charged in the locality for
similar services, the amount involved in the case, and the result
attained, and the expertise and experience of the attorneys
involved. Rasband. 752 P.2d at 1336 (quoting Cabrera v. Cottrell,
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694 P.2d 622, 624-25 (Utah 1985)).
The attorney fees in this action were reasonable considering
this action in light of the factors set out above.

Plaint if f's

attorney stated that he charges $100.00 per hour, which he believes
to be a reasonable fee. T. 172 Defendant's attorney stipulated as
to the reasonableness of the $100.00 per hour fee. T. 172 and 276
The Court, after reviewing the transcript, will clearly find that
this has been a difficult action.

Plaintiff's attorney has had to

conduct discovery, and has had to take defendant's deposition in
order to obtain evidence of defendant's financial condition. T. 172
Defendant did not furnish any of the documents requested in
discovery, and could not explain where his money came from during
his deposition. T. 267
As the transcript demonstrates, plaintiff's attorney has had
difficulty in sifting through the facts and cashflows of the
defendant. T. 263

This difficulty was caused in large part by the

inability or unwillingness of defendant to cooperate in detailing
his financial condition.

Defendant's attorney admitted to the

difficulty of the case, especially in knowing where the cash came
from. T. 269
Plaintiff's attorney also stated that this action had taken 35
hours to prepare, in addition to the time of the trial and the time
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to prepare the Findings.

Plaintiff's attorney also spent time on

discovery and taking defendant's deposition. T. 172

Defendant's

attorney, after admitting to the difficulty of the case, later
stated that he believed that 20 hours was a reasonable amount of
time. T. 276

Defendant's attorney had already admitted that $100

per hour was reasonable. T. 276

Thus, in the estimation of

defendant's attorney a reasonable fee would be $2000.00.

This is

exactly what the trial court awarded in attorney fees; therefore,
defendant should not now be heard to complain about the award of
$2000.00 in attorney fees.
In fact it may be argued that the trial court's award was in
error because plaintiff's attorney requested $3500.00 in attorney
fees.

The trial court lowered the award of attorney fees to the

amount stipulated to by defendant's attorney as reasonable, without
any statement as to why it had reduced the award.
The Court has stated that "[t]he court abuses its discretion
in awarding less than the amount [of attorney fees] requested
unless the reduction is warranted" by one or more of the above
factors. The trial court must, accordingly, identify such factors
on the record and also explain its sua sponte reduction in order to
permit meaningful review on appeal. Haumont, 793 P.2d at 426,
(quoting Martindale v. Adams. 777 P.2d 514, 518 (Utah App. 1989)).
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The trial court did not identify any factors on the record that
would warrant a reduction

in the attorney

fees requested by

plaintiff. Defendant certainly should not now be heard to question
the award of $2000.00 in attorney fees given the stipulation by
defendant's attorney.
The Court has further stated that the award must be based on
evidence of the financial need of the receiving spouse, the ability
of the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested
fees. Rasband, 752 P. 2d at 1337.

The Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law have clearly shown that plaintiff lacks the
ability to pay the fees.
$4 00.00 per

month

Conclusions of Law)

in

Plaintiff is only making approximately
income. R.

73

(Findings

of

Fact

and

If plaintiff were to bear the expense of

attorney fees, it would require five months of her earnings for her
to pay the fees leaving her without any funds to live on for those
five months.
As to defendant's

ability to pay the

fees, defendant's

financial condition has been clearly and exhaustively detailed in
POINT I. of this argument. Defendant's income of $350.00 per month
from social security, his $10,000.00 - $12,000.00 per year in
interest income, and his $25,000.00 per year in rental income from
the three sections of his farming property put defendant in a far
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better position to bear the attorney fees in this action. T. 232,
236, and 275.
Thus in considering the reasonableness of the attorney fees,
the financial need of the plaintiff, and the ability of defendant
to pay, it is clear that the trial court's award was proper and
within its discretion.
B. Plaintiff is Entitled to Attorney Fees on This Appeal.
The Court has stated that " [o]rdinarily, when fees in a
divorce were awarded below to the party who then prevails on
appeal, fees will also be awarded to that party on appeal." Bell v.
Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 494 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting Burt v. Burt, 799
P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah App. 1990)).
Thus,

if the Court affirms the trial

court's decision,

plaintiff should be entitled to her attorney fees which she has
incurred in opposing this appeal.

The attorney fees incurred on

this appeal should be remanded for a hearing at the trial court.
CONCLUSION
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding
alimony to the plaintiff.

The court properly considered the

financial condition and needs of the plaintiff, the ability of the
plaintiff to produce an income for herself, and the ability of the
defendant to provide support. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions
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of Law are adequate to support the trial court's award.
The trial court's ruling in regard to the income tax liability
was proper and within the proper scope of the courts discretion.
The tax liability was incurred to benefit defendant, and he
promised plaintiff that he would pay any tax liability that arose.
Defendant should be obligated to live up to the agreement he had
with the plaintiff; therefore, the trial court's ruling was proper.
Finally, the trial court did not err in awarding plaintiff
attorney fees.

Sufficient facts were entered with regard to

plaintiff's need, defendant's ability to pay, and as to the
reasonableness of the fees.

Plaintiff should also be entitled to

an award of the attorney fees which she was forced to incur in
seeking to have the trial court's ruling upheld.

Plaintiff asks

this Court to remand to the trial court for an award of attorney
fees on appeal. Based upon these reasons this Court should affirm
the trial court's ruling, and remand for attorney fees on appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/o

day of September, 1993.

JMANN,
e ^giK
HADFIELD & THORNE
Attorneys for Appellee
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FOOTNOTES
1.

All references are to the pages of the original record as

paginated by the Clerk of the District Court, pursuant to the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 25 (e). All documents in the
record referred to will be found in the Appendix in the order
referred to in the Brief.

For purpose of clarity, the following

abbreviations shall be adopted by Appellee:
"R." refers to the record with its page number and title of
the document in parenthesis.
"T." refers to the transcript.

pj/3:appeal.jhb
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ADDENDUM A
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Jeff R. Thorne of Mann, Hadfield & Thorne #3250
Attorney for Plaintiff
Zions Bank Building - 98 North Main
P. O. Box 876
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0876
Telephone: 723-3404
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KAYLENE S. SMITH,

]

Plaintiff,

])

vs.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

]

ODELL M. SMITH, JR.,

])

Civil No. 910000459DA

Defendant.

]1

Judge Clint S. Judkins

The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 28th
day of August, 1992 at the hour of 10:00 o'clock a.m.

The

plaintiff was personally present and was represented by her
counsel of record, Jeff R. Thorne of the firm of Mann, Hadfield
and Thorne.

The defendant was present and was represented by his

counsel, Brent E. Johns.

The plaintiff introduced her evidence

and testified in said matter; and the defendant introduced his
evidence and testified in said matter.

The court being fully

familiar in the premises issues the following Findings of Fact.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
1.

RELATIONSHIP PRIOR TO MARRIAGE

The parties have had a romantic relationship beginning in 1980.
From 1986 and continuing up to the date the parties were married

(OCT 14 199^

Smith vs Smith, #910000459
Findings & Conclusions
on August 14, 1989 at Challis, Idaho the parties spent the
majority of each week living together.

Even though the parties

had an intimate relationship, the parties did not represent
themselves to be husband and wife to their friends or to their
family.

It was commonly recognized by plaintiff's family that

they were "living together" the majority of time from 1986 to the
time they were married.

The parties relationship contributed to

each party's divorce from their prior spouses.
DATE OF MARRIAGE
2.

The plaintiff and defendant were married on August 14,

1989 at Challis, Idaho.
NO CHILDREN
3.

No children have been born as issue of said marriage

and none are expected.
RESIDENCE OF PARTIES
4.

The plaintiff and the defendant are residents of Box

Elder County, State of Utah, and have been for more than three
months immediately prior to the commencement of this action.
GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE
5.

During the course of the marriage and the months

preceding the filing of the action, irreconcilable differences
developed such that the very purposes of the marriage were
destroyed.
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Smith vs Smith, #910000459
Findings & Conclusions
DEFENDANT'S PROPERTY FROM PRIOR MARRIAGE
6.

Odell Smith was divorced from his former wife, Renae

Smith in March, 1986 in the State of Idaho.

As part of his

written settlement agreement with his first wife, Odell Smith was
entitled to cash payments of $210,000.00 and $150,000.00. The
prior divorce decree provided that the $210,000.00 was to be paid
$30,000.00 on or before April 20, 1986, $30,000.00 upon the
closing of a loan (the terms of the loan were mentioned in the
decree), $150,000,000 payable in annual payments of $25,000.00
per year including interest at the rate of eight percent annum
from the date of March 27, 1986. Additionally, Mr. Smith was to
be paid by his former wife an additional $150,000.00 within five
years from the date of the divorce.

The payments were to

compensate Mr. Smith for his share of the marital assets in his
first marriage.

Mr. Smith, also, received other assets under his

prior divorce.
ASSETS IN BANKS AT TIME OF THE DIVORCE
7.

At the time the divorce action was filed, there was in

an account in the name of Odell M. Smith with American First
Credit Union a balance of $41,275.00 as of September 14, 1991,
together with a share savings account in the amount of $9,532.16.
Mr. Smith testified at one time Kaylenefs name was on his
checking account, but he removed it because "she spent too much."
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Odell Smith also had five different certificates of deposit with
First Security Bank in Challis, Idaho.

The money was deposited

on March 27, 1991, each account had initial deposit of $36,000.00
and which accrued interest at the rate of 6.83% per annum.

These

accounts totalled $180,000.00 on March 17, 1992. Mr. Smith
testified the money for these accounts came from payments from
his first wife.
CHALLI8 PROPERTY
8.

Odell Smith also received a cabin and real property in

Challis, Idaho, which came from his divorce settlement with his
first wife.
$249,120.93 PAYMENT RECEIVED DURING THIS MARRIAGE
9.

Odell Smith received the sum of $249,120.93 on or about

March 27, 1991 from his former wife and/or son for his share of
any interest in the farm properties he was awarded under his
prior divorce decree.

Mr. Smith was unable to articulate how the

amount of money was computed.

He was unable to state whether

the money constituted earnings off the farm property which he
held in common with his ex-wife or whether it was all principal
or interest from the sale of the property.
HOME PURCHASED IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO MARRIAGE
10.

A home was purchased at 70 North 200 East, Brigham

City, Utah on June 27, 1989, approximately six weeks prior to the
time the parties were married.

Title to the home was only in Mr.
4
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Smith's name.

The home was purchased with Mrs. Smith's consent

and knowledge and was the marital home of the parties.

The

parties stipulated that the home had a market value of
$63,000.00, and there exists a lien against the home in the
approximate amount of $29,000,00. A $25,000.00 down payment was
made by the defendant out of his separate funds.

The court

determines that there is a $9,000.00 equity in the family home.
AUTOMOBILE PURCHASED DURING MARRIAGE
11.

In July, 1991 a 1991 Dodge Shadow automobile was

purchased, which has a fair market value of $7,000.00. The
automobile was purchased with funds from the checking account
with America First Credit Union account.
LOT AND STORAGE PURCHASED IN 1986
12.

The defendant purchased a lot and storage building in

1986 in Brigham City, Utah.

The lot and building has a fair

market value of $18,500.00.

This real estate was titled in Mr.

Smith's name.
PERSONAL PROPERTY BEFORE MARRIAGE
13.

The plaintiff had a table and four chairs, a roll-top

desk, a couch, a green rocker, a square end table, a bathroom
bench, and a green hanging lamp, which was her property before
the marriage which was taken to the cabin in Challis, Idaho after
the parties were married.
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PROPERTY ACQUIRED DURING MARRIAGE
14.

During the marriage, the parties purchased a three-

piece white leather furniture set, two area rugs, a grandfather
clock, a toaster, various wall hangings, a silk flower
arrangement, and vacuum.
MEDICAL NEEDS OF PLAINTIFF
15.

The plaintiff is in need of surgery pursuant to a

letter of Dr. C. M. Dibble, M.D. which was admitted into
evidence.

Plaintifffs medical condition requiring surgery arose

during this marriage.
EMPLOYMENT OF PLAINTIFF
16.

Prior to the parties' marriage, the plaintiff was

working and earning net income of approximately $1,000.00 per
month.

Plaintiff also was earning $1,000.00 during this f M K ^

marriage.

The plaintiff terminated her employment because of th<

w^skufl and dCLiliLb uf the deftSH35j¥fc and plaintiff is now only
making approximately $400.00 income per month.
LIVING EXPENSES OF PLAINTIFF
17.

The plaintiff needs income on an average monthly basis

of $1,162.00 to enable her to live similar to how she lived
during the marriage and to meet her current living expenses and
obligations.
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SOCIAL SECURITY AVAILABILITY TO DEFENDANT
18.

The defendant is eligible for social security, but has

not applied for social security at the present time.

The

defendant states that he would be entitled to social security of
approximately $350.00 per month.

The defendant has not been

employed during the time the parties have been married.
DEBTS
19.

The only debts are the debt existing against the home

in Brigham City, Utah.
AS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FROM THE FOREGOING FINDINGS OF FACT
THE COURT CONCLUDES:
MARRIAGE PROPERTY
1.

The only joint property the parties have acquired

during the time of the marriage is the equity in the home which
was purchased.

The court sets the equity at $9,000.00. The

defendant shall pay to the plaintiff $4,500.00 within 60 days as
and for her share of the equity.
AUTOMOBILE
2.

The 1991 Dodge automobile was purchased with the

defendant's separate funds.

The automobile will be awarded to

the defendant.

PERSONAL PROPERTY
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3.
vacuum.

The plaintiff shall be awarded the loveseat, chair and
The defendant shall receive the remainder of the items

acquired during the marriage.
PERSONAL PROPERTY ACQUIRED PRIOR TO MARRIAGE
4.

The plaintiff shall be entitled to the items of

property which were taken to the cabin in Challis, Idaho which
were hers prior to the time the parties married.

Those items of

property are the table and four chairs, roll-top desk, couch,
green rocker, square end table, bathroom bench, and green hanging
lamp.

The defendant shall return those items to plaintiff within

10 days.
MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS
5.

The defendant shall be awarded the Bible, the carved

Bible stand, the Revere Ware, the five quart pan with lilac
handles, the pressure cooker, the knife block and paring knives,
as well as any of his cassette tapes which may be in plaintiff's
possession.

All other items of personal property which plaintiff

has in her possession shall remain hers and shall be her sole and
separate property.

PLAINTIFF'S UNINSURED MEDICAL EXPENSES
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6.

The defendant shall pay any medical expenses related to

plaintiff's surgery not covered by insurance, if those expenses
are incurred within the next six (6) months.
LOT AND STORAGE SHED
7.

The court finds that the lot and storage shed were

purchased by separate funds by the defendant and are awarded to
him.
HOME
8.

The home of the parties is awarded to the defendant

subject to a lien in the amount of $4,500.00 to be paid by the
defendant to the plaintiff within 60 days from the date of this
hearing.
INCOME TAX LIABILITY
9.

The defendant shall pay the income tax liability to the

State of Utah or IRS for all years during the marriage.
PLAINTIFF RESTORED TO FORMER NAME
10.

The plaintiff has requested that she be restored to her

former name of Koyle and the plaintifffs name shall henceforth be
and she shall be known as Kathleen S. Koyle.
ATTORNEY FEES
11.

The plaintiff is awarded $2,000.00 attorneyfs fees and

judgment shall enter against the defendant in favor of the
plaintiff in said amount.
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INTEREST ON SAVINGS ACCOUNT
12.

The court finds that any interest earned on the

$180,000.00 at First Security Bank in Idaho was marital property,
but that income was dissipated in living expenses during the time
the parties were married.
EXTRA MARITAL AFFAIR
13.

Even though the parties had a long-term relationship,

the majority of that time was spent as an extra marital rather
than a marriage relationship.
ALIMONY
14.

The plaintiff has suffered an economic disadvantage as

a result of the marriage in that she does not have as good as
employment as she had before the marriage and during the marriage
before she quit her employment at the urging of the defendant.
The plaintiff is entitled to alimony for four years.
twice as long as the length of the marriage.

Alimony is

The court will,

however, give the defendant credit for one year of alimony
inasmuch as they have been separated and the defendant has been
paying temporary alimony since September, 1991. The defendant
shall pay alimony to the plaintiff in the amount of $643.00
beginning with the month of September, 1992 for a period of one
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year, or until August of 1993.

Thereafter, he shall pay alimony

in the amount of $600.00 per month for the next two years or up
until August of 1995.
DATED this

£ /

&*£&*

day of

CLIIJI^NHKJDKINS

DISTRICT JUDGE PRO TEM
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
Brent E. Johns
Attorney for Defendant
pj/3:smith-k.fnd
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Jeff R. Thorne of Mann, Hadfield & Thorne #3250
Attorney for Plaintiff
Zions Bank Building - 98 North Main
P. O. Box 876
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0876
Telephone: 723-3404
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KAYLENE S. SMITH,
Plaintiff,

;)

vs.

DECREE OF DIVORCE

]

ODELL M. SMITH, JR.,

])

Defendant.

I

Civil No. 910000459DA
Judge Clint S. Judkins

The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 28th
day of August, 1992 at the hour of 10:00 o'clock a.m.

The

plaintiff was personally present and was represented by her
counsel of record, Jeff R. Thorne of the firm of Mann, Hadfield
and Thorne.

The defendant was present and was represented by his

counsel, Brent E. Johns.

The plaintiff introduced her evidence

and testified in said matter; and the defendant introduced his
evidence and testified in said matter.

The court having entered

its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby,
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

DECREE OF DIVORCE

The plaintiff may have a decree of divorce from the
defendant, the decree to become final upon signing by the court.
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2.

MARRIAGE PROPERTY

The only joint property the parties have acquired during the
time of the marriage is the equity in the home which was
purchased.

The court sets the equity at $9,000.00.

The

defendant shall pay to the plaintiff $4,500.00 within 60 days as
and for her share of the equity.
3

AUTOMOBILE

The 1991 Dodge automobile was purchased with the defendant's
separate funds. The automobile will be awarded to the defendant.
4.

PERSONAL PROPERTY

The plaintiff shall be awarded the loveseat, chair and
vacuum.

The defendant shall receive the remainder of the items

acquired during the marriage.
5.

PERSONAL PROPERTY ACQUIRED PRIOR TO MARRIAGE

The plaintiff shall be entitled to the items of property
which were taken to the cabin in Challis, Idaho which were hers
prior to the time the parties married.

Those items of property

are the table and four chairs, roll-top desk, couch, green
rocker, square end table, bathroom bench, and green hanging lamp.
The defendant shall return those items to plaintiff within 10
days.
6.

MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS

The defendant shall be awarded the Bible, the carved Bible
stand, the Revere Ware, the five quart pan with lilac handles,
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the pressure cooker, the knife block and paring knives, as well
as any of his cassette tapes which may be in plaintiff's
possession.

All other items of personal property which plaintiff

has in her possession shall remain hers and shall be her sole and
separate property.
7.

PLAINTIFF'S UNINSURED MEDICAL EXPENSES

The defendant shall pay any medical expenses related to
plaintiff's surgery not covered by insurance, if those expenses
are incurred within the next six (6) months.
8.

LOT AND STORAGE SHED

The court finds that the lot and storage shed were purchased
by separate funds by the defendant and are awarded to him.
9.

HOME

The home of the parties is awarded to the defendant subject
to a lien in the amount of $4,500.00 to be paid by the defendant
to the plaintiff within 60 days from the date of this hearing.
10.

INCOME TAX LIABILITY

The defendant shall pay the income tax liability to the
State of Utah or IRS for all years during the marriage.
11.

PLAINTIFF RESTORED TO FORMER NAME

The plaintiff has requested that she be restored to her
former name of Koyle and the plaintifffs name shall henceforth be
and she shall be known as Kathleen S. Koyle.
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12.

ATTORNEY FEES

The plaintiff is awarded $2,000.00 attorney's fees and
judgment shall enter against the defendant in favor of the
plaintiff in said amount.
13.

INTEREST ON SAVINGS ACCOUNT

The court finds that any interest earned on the $180,000.00
at First Security Bank in Idaho was marital property, but that
income was dissipated in living expenses during the time the
parties were married.
14.

EXTRA MARITAL AFFAIR

Even though the parties had a long-term relationship, the
majority of that time was spent as an extra marital rather than a
marriage relationship.
15.

ALIMONY

The plaintiff has suffered an economic disadvantage as a
result of the marriage in that she does not have as good as
employment as she had before the marriage and during the marriage
before she quit her employment at the urging of the defendant.
The plaintiff is entitled to alimony for four years.
twice as long as the length of the marriage.

Alimony is

The court will,

however, give the defendant credit for one year of alimony
inasmuch as they have been separated and the defendant has been
paying temporary alimony since September, 1991.
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shall pay alimony to the plaintiff in the amount of $643.00
beginning with the month of September, 1992 for a period of one
year, or until August of 1993.

Thereafter, he shall pay alimony

in the amount of $600.00 per month for the next two years or up
until August of 1995.
16.

DIVORCE FINAL UPON SIGNING

Good cause appearing to the court, the divorce decree shall
be final upon signing by the court. A
DATED this

\ ^

A

day of

CL:
DISTRI
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
Brent E. Johns
Attorney for Defendant
pj/3:saiith-k.dec
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